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Posts Tagged ‘Economic Development’

The sharp division between developed and developing countries is often described as the “North-South Divide.” The term was coined during the cold war as a way to geographically categorise countries on the basis of their socio-economic development level. With the rise of the Asian Tigers, Newly Industrialising Economies and not to mention Middle Eastern oil wealth, many has deemed the term passé. With the supposedly many examples of rich countries residing in low latitudes I thought it would be interesting to analyse the data statistically and to demonstrate the phenomenon graphically.

GDP per Capita vs Latitude

The chart clearly demonstrates the economic division between societies predominantly around the equator (0 degrees latitude) and the societies to the north and south. Using the term North-South Divide is clearly not passé, although one should be aware of the exceptions that proves the rule.

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The climatic and natural conditions found within the northern and southern territories of pre-modern China were conducive to wheat and rice cultivation respectively. Soil qualities, regularity of precipitation, the existence of rivers providing ease of irrigation and the length of frost-free time periods gave these types of agriculture comparative advantages within each respective geo-climatic zone. Rice gives superior yields compared to wheat, on average 2.75 t/ha versus 1.95 t/ha, moreover a farmer growing rice in a wet field can expect a yield of 2 t/ha without applying any mineral fertiliser, relying on the nitrogen-fixing organisms occurring naturally in the paddy-fields[1].

Chinese Terraced Rice Paddies (“Dragon’s Backbone”)

The rice plant’s high yield to seed ratio was an important aspect for the early subsistence farmers, minimising the portion of the yield reserved for cultivating the next crop. Produce was intensified over time through the adoption of multi-cropping, fertilisation, development of drought-resistant strains of seed, innovation in farming tools and through sophisticated water control and irrigation techniques[2].

Thus the stable, high-yield nature of rice farming presented the proto-Chinese peoples with high opportunity costs of engaging in different types of agricultural production. The skills-oriented nature of rice farming, its labour intensiveness, the divisibility of capital inputs and the substantial demands it made in coordinating and controlling planting would limit economies of scale and centralisation[3]. This would discourage consolidation of farming units and enable the agricultural sector to retain its fragmentary ownership structure with the household small-holding as its main component.

Institutions

Institutions would play a crucial role in facilitating and exacerbating high-yield farming in Chinese society, the primary element of these institutions were property rights. It is estimated that an average of 70% of the Chinese rural households were free-holding farmers[4]. The effects of such a societal configuration was that the point of gravitation in terms of political power lay with the peasant stratum.

A 'seedling-horse', yang ma, illustrated in the Nongzheng quanshu

This would engender a physiocratic state[5] responding to the requirements of the majority and actively facilitating and expanding the agrarian element of the empire through policy measures. The meritocratic constitution of this bureaucracy and its success in recruiting a majority of its constituent officials from the poorer levels of the peasant stratum has been a contributory factor in these policy decisions[6].

Property rights were central to the expansion and preservation of high-yield agriculture as it gave farmers incentives to increase the marginal productivity of their land and awarded stability to the family unit through equal inheritance among siblings. Deng[7] has identified three necessary conditions for the longevity of such a system: ‘(1) the replication mechanism of the ownership system within the Chinese basic economic unit – the family; (2) the accessibility of arable land through the territorial expansion of the Chinese empire; and (3) the intensive methods of land utilisation with the advancement of Chinese agronomy to produce more food from the same acreage.’ Land reforms were effectuated to distribute agricultural land among landless peasants and limit consolidation of larger estates[8].

Chinese Rice Cultivation

Another policy measure adopted by the state was price controls on grains aimed at mitigating the effects of market volatility and establishing a price floor sustaining the agricultural production cycle[9]. Authorities also facilitated the distribution of high yielding rice plant varieties as seen in the Song dynasty in AD 1012 when the emperor Zhenzong sent to Fujian province 30,000 bushels of Champa rice[10]. Enhancements in agricultural efficiency were also made through the commissioning master farmers educating the population in efficient agricultural techniques[11].

The Song dynasty also put in place financial incentives for making investments in agricultural land through low interest loans, lowered taxation rates and tax rebates on newly reclaimed land[12]. Communal cooperation structures were developed to mitigate the effects of volatile labour demand inherent in sowing and harvesting. These structures also facilitated the efficient use of water resources such as irrigation and sought to mitigate flooding. Thus the Chinese civilisation’s adoption of high-yield agriculture can be said to be a hybrid result of suitable natural conditions and the institutions developed over the course of time entrenching its fundamental position.

Long-Term Economic and Social Effects

The Chinese society’s adoption of high-yielding agriculture has had extensive and long lasting effects upon its configuration and given its civilisation a unique character. The primary results of this type of agriculture has been to engender autonomy and egalitarianism[13] among its populace through its fragmented ownership structure and facilitate the formation of a physiocratic state and values favouring the predominance of the agricultural sector before that of a merchant class.

The immediate effects most striking to an outside observer has been to sustain the comparatively large populations found in rice-growing societies, ensuring a substantial labour pool increasing the opportunity costs of investing in mechanical capital innovation. The non-feudal ownership structure and equal inheritance practice had the effect of ‘tying people to the land’ whereby a comparatively disproportionate amount of labour would be provided incentives for remaining in the agricultural sector and not seek a career elsewhere[14].

Champa Rice

This ‘self-confinement effect’ led to a reduction of economic divergence and at a macro level was the basis of China’s path dependency[15]. A result of self-sufficiency and the practice of small-scale trade of surplus led to the underdevelopment of credit facilities, in turn limiting the scope for commercialisation. Fairbank[16] maintains: the creation of credit among the villages was retarded by the relative self-sufficiency of the peasant household and its dependence upon short-term purchases from sources close at hand’.

The political dominance of the peasant stratum also had implications for imperial expansion policy whereby conquest was primarily geared towards gaining new land territories contiguous to its agricultural zone. Its territorial expansion led to a socio-economic monoculture on the Chinese mainland precluding intra-regional political competition leading to little ‘opportunity for the promotion of new social institutions to take advantage of Chinese inventive genius’[17].

Water Lift

However the main effect of China’s agrarian preponderance has been to hinder the emergence of a substantial professional merchant class, a stratum of society that would facilitate large-scale markets and lead to a higher degree of labour specialisation and ultimately industrialisation. Deng[18] has pointed to a two-fold reason for this: As the Chinese government provided a political or ultra-economic check on the growth of the merchant class through trade legislation and state monopoly on key markets, the Chinese peasantry delivered an operational check at the grass-roots level on the growth of the merchant class with its own active involvement in market activities at all levels as producers and consumers’. This double-check was augmented by the predominant values of egalitarian China seeing trading as a zero-sum game, tolerating a rich state but not the emergence of rich individuals[19].

In essence the long term socio-economic effects of high-yield agriculture was the emergence of a relatively autonomous, egalitarian and self-sufficient population able to repel central government infringement through rebellions and saving the Chinese populace from feudal bonds and serfdom so widespread in contemporary Europe. Through its social majority and military strength the Chinese peasant strata consolidated its power in society by exerting political power through the formation of the physiocratic state.

This entrenched the position of the agrarian socio-economic system and would lead to a cycle of perpetuating dominance through land reforms and policies aimed at agricultural favouritism. With the formalisation of agricultural predominance and the self-confinement effect engendered through property rights and inheritance, came little scope for economic divergence. The result of which was the marginalisation of a professional merchant class capable of instigating the economic pre-requisites for industrialisation.

Thus the high-yield attributes of Chinese agriculture came to be a double-edged sword in that it on the one hand enabled large-scale self-sufficiency and autonomy for the Chinese populace it also came to have a disproportionately domineering position in Chinese socio-economic and political life, to the detriment of the pre-requisites necessary for modern commercialisation and industrialisation.


[1] Bray, F. (1986) The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies. University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles p.13&14

[2] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy: Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist Sterility. Routledge: New York p.38

[3] Bray, F. (1986) The Rice Economies p. 115

[4] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p. 55

[5] A physiocratic state can be defined as an ‘agrarian bureaucratic state’ (Goldstone 1991: 41).

[6] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p.83

[7] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p.55

[8] Bray, F. (1986) The Rice Economies

[9] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p. 88-89

[10] Bray, F. (1986) The Rice Economies p. 22

[11] Bray, F. (1986) The Rice Economies p. 204

[12] Bray, F. (1986) The Rice Economies p. 204

[13] This principle is crystallised in a Confucian maxim: ‘Our anxiety is not for poverty but for inequality in society’ (buhuanpin erhuanbujun) (Kong Q. c. 479 BC: ch. ‘Jishi’). Deng p. 69, & 71

[14] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p.69, 70 & 71

[15] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p. 71

[16] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p.81 Fairbank (1965: 49)

[17] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p. 108 (Merson 1989: 78).

[18] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p.84

[19] Deng, G. (1999) The Premodern Chinese Economy p.96

Recommended Reading:

The Premodern Chinese Economy, Deng, G. (1999)

The Rice Economies, Bray, F. (1986)

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The partition had left the European powers in control of the African continent, what followed was resource extraction in order to make the venture profitable. The industrial revolution had greatly enhanced the world’s demand for raw materials, commodities such as cotton, rubber, coal, iron ore, copper and others had increased enough in value to justify a substantial transport leg. In economic terms the European states had only vertically integrated their supply chain through the seizure of the upstream suppliers, now controlling both the midstream (manufacturing) and the downstream (consumer markets). By exercising formal control of the raw material suppliers, the need for operating through middlemen and their affiliated cost would be lowered in addition to substantially reducing the risk for investors. The lowered long term risk would thus both increase the availability and reduce the cost of capital, capital needed to construct the infrastructure required for transportation of the raw materials. The infrastructure constructed were mainly roads, telegraph cables, harbours and railways. It vastly increased the profitability of extracting low-value high-bulk commodities such as minerals or perishable goods such as agricultural produce. Before they were constructed the economy would rely on the availability of rivers or porterage, the latter being slow, expensive and not to mention highly dangerous. Maintaining the infrastructure requires a strong state apparatus with the ability to either finance its upkeep itself or attract outside investment, this again hinges on the state’s ability to keep the investor’s perception of affiliated risk low in relation to the potential reward. With the independent African nations’ dismal record of misgovernment, this type of foreign direct investment has been hard to attract, leading to a vicious circle of under-development and economic regression.

Chinese financed TAZARA railway in Tanzania

However, over the last decade a new player has appeared on the world stage, an economy that has maintained a double digit annual growth rate since the early 1980s and has now emerged as the global manufacturing hub. China now produces 47.6% of the world’s annual steel output, or 567 million tonnes (2009), this compares to 16.1% or 123 mt only ten years earlier. It’s role as the world’s supplier of manufactured goods has led to a huge jump in its demand for raw materials, commodities such as iron ore, steam coal, met coal, crude oil, and a range of metals and minerals. Despite maintaining the world’s largest reserves of coal, China prefers to meet its demand through seaborne imports from primarily Indonesia and Australia, but also South Africa is a substantial supplier. The same goes for iron ore, where an estimated 80% of steel is produced from ore imported from mainly Australia or Brazil. The reason is simple, the low transportation costs combined with the high quality (FE content for ore, carbon content for coal) of the foreign commodities makes them more cost efficient than using the domestic materials.

For Africa, Chinese commodity demand growth represents a significant economic opportunity, possessing substantial mineral and metal deposits. To make their extraction and export economically feasible would require investments into the colonial transportation infrastructure or construction of new networks. But political risk is still an element preventing such investments from taking place, contemporary China as opposed to the European 19th Century powers, cannot merely intervene military and assume sovereignty over the supplying territories, but needs to proceed through the formal political and commercial channels. Should China manage to sustain its economic growth level and still favour imports to cover commodity demand, African countries with substantial raw material factor endowments in addition to low political risk will be the continent’s economic winners over the medium to long term.

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What strikes the outside observer when contemplating Africa’s recent economic past is the constant relative decline in relation to that of advanced industrial economies. A random sample of five former British colonies testifies to this negative trend. Interestingly, their economies in relative terms to that of their imperial master were not in a dire shape in the 1960s – early 70s.

One Dollar (Rhodesia, 1970)

Taking Rhodesia/Zimbabwe as an example, the Rhodesian GDP per Capita remained steady at the interval 15-20% of the UK equivalent despite sanctions from the mid-60s due to their unilateral declaration of independence. The insurgency clearly took it’s toll from the mid-70s and upon transition to Mugabe’s ZANU PF’s rule from 1980 saw a brief comeback due to international aid. However from the mid-80s until today the economy is in complete shambles, with the average Zimbabwean being 100 times poorer in GDP per Capita terms to that of the average UK citizen. This compares with the 1960-70s when the average Rhodesian only was five times poorer, comparable to that of the average Mexican vs Briton today.

One Hundred Trillion Dollars (Zimbabwe, 2008)

The chart illustrates that economic conditions were on average, in relative terms, better prior to independence for these African countries. There are complex reasons for how this has come about, but misgovernment resulting in the weakening of institutions and instability has been leading proximate causes in both Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone. Another has been the reliance on a poorly diversified portfolio of export commodities in tandem with falling international demand.

(Source: NationMaster.com GDP per Capita Data 1960-2006)..

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Is there a relationship between a society’s level of socio-economic development and it’s level of violence? There is, as this chart seem to suggest.

I used the parameters murder rate per 1000 citizens and GDP per Capita (2006) and charted it in a scatterplot. What is interesting is that the murder rate (as a proxy for violence) increases exponentially when the GDP per Capita falls below ca: $10,000/year. This is however not a necessary outcome as per the other relatively poor countries where the murder rate remains at the level of the richer countries. The economic development level might be said to represent the watershed where a society reaches a critical mass of institutions. It would be an interesting study to compare and contrast these countries to discover the reasons for their low murder rate, despite their low income level. One must read the GDP per Capita variable as a proxy for overall development, it is fair to presume that high income countries have a highly functioning state apparatus, lower levels of corruption etc than the low income countries.

What, however, this data does suggest is that “every day violence” and socio-economic development are closely related, it is a near universal phenomenon. Over the years fanciful explanations for Africa’s high levels of violence have been put forward by academics, linking it to globalisation, media or “Africans’ inherently violent nature.” By extrapolating the violence to socio-economic development trend to these polities exhibiting low development levels, high levels of violence are easily predicted, especially when keeping in mind the exponential nature of the trend line.

One can fairly conclude that violence rises exponentially in a society that lies below the watershed representing the critical mass of institutional development, but once this level is reached it would be readily presumed that violence will subside as a result of the self-reinforcing effect of socio-economic progression.

http://www.nationmaster.com/plot/eco_gdp_percap-economy-gdp-per-capita/cri_mur_percap-crime-murders-per-capita/peo_pop&id=EUR

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