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Sir John Kirk, the British Consul to the Sultan of Zanzibar, received in 1884 a report from his Vice-Consul John G. (Jack) Haggard. The brother of Victorian writer H. Rider Haggard  had summarised his adventurous journey from his station on the Island of Lamu to the rebellious Simba, Sultan of Witu. As the Vice-Consul’s more famous brother never visited East Africa, it might be speculated that reports such as this acted as inspiration for his long list of publications from 1885 onwards.

Vice-Consul Haggard to Sir J. Kirk

Lamu, East Coast of Africa, August 25, 1884.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I left this place in my boat at daylight on Monday, the 12thAugust for Kolumbi, with the intention of visiting the rebel Chief, Ahmet-bin-Sultan Komloot, commonly known as “Simba” (the Lion), who now resides in the fortified village of Witu, about four days’ easy journey to the southward of Lamu.

Lamu Fort

Simba, who is now a very old man and a cripple, is of the Wagunia race of Nelhani-Arab descent, and was formerly King of the island of Patta, about 15 miles to the northward of Lamu. After many years’ fighting and heavy slaughter he was driven from there, about fifteen years ago, by the then Sultan of Zanzibar, who took his island, and Simba fled to Kau on the river Ozy, where he settled, and began to collect round him a new tribe in the place of the one which he had annihilated. After living for a few years at Kau he was again driven abroad by the same power, and this time he migrated to the wilderness and settled at a place called Witu, where he has practically been since undisturbed, and his following, which is composed chiefly of all the malcontents, bankrupts, and felons of the surrounding country, and very largely also of runaway slaves, has, in consequence, become numerous, powerful, and dreaded. These people are now best known by the name of “Watoro,” or runaways, but they call themselves “Watawitu,” with the exception of the inhabitants of a few of the more northern villages, who call themselves “Wakengi,” or the “Restless people,” which is a very good name for them.

Of late years all these people have lived chiefly by plundering the neighbouring Swahili villages, and by selling the captured inhabitants as slaves to the Somalis in exchange for cattle, or not unfrequently back to the Swahilis themselves, from whom they again invariably take the earliest opportunity of restealing them.

H. Rider Haggard

Of course, these raids have been productive of much bloodshed and distress, and as the Watoro have grown more and more powerful, so their depredations and enormities have become more and more frequent, and the sense of insecurity experienced by the neighbouring Swahilis shows itself in the fact that less and less land is cultivated every year, for no man now dare work alone in his own field if only a few hundred yards away from his village. The hands of the Watoro are now against almost every man, and almost every man’s hand is against them. Although they live not far from the sea they have but one port open to them, and that is the village of Kipini at the mouth of the River Ozy, the Governor of which place is afraid to deny them entrance.

Some of my objects in visiting Simba were to point out to him the advantages of legitimate trade, and of checking his people’s marauding tastes, and to ask permission for a trader to settle in Witu: having found a Hindi merchant with sufficient courage to attempt it, this man I took with me.

Some four months ago I had written to Simba to propose this visit, but circumstances had prevented me from making the journey until now.

I arrived at Kolumbi at 8 p.m. of the 12th August, after a difficult passage, and finding the small-pox was raging with great virulence there made my whole party sleep in the boat.

To show the disturbed state of the country, on this very day a man and a boy left Kolumbi to go to Harura, a Swahili village contiguous to the Watoro districts; near Harura they approached a fire they saw burning to warm themselves, but round which, unfortunately for the Swahilis, six Wakengi were stretched: they jumped up to seize the Swahilis, and one man captured the boy, holding him by the left wrist, whilst he watched the remainder pursuing the man unsuccessfully. The lad suddenly drew his captor’s knife and stabbed the man twice in the stomach, killing him: the remainder of the party coming up at that moment the boy was stabbed in the back, but somehow he managed to et away then, to die in Kolumbi a few hours later.

Witu as a German Protectorate in 1890 prior to the Anglo-German Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty (1890)

On the following morning, the 13th August, I started for Mpecatoni, as early as possible to visit the Headman of Kolumbi in his village, and there saw many poor wretches crawling about in all stages of the disease; the Headman himself had just lost one son from small-pox, he had another one sick, and was himself only then recovering from the illness.

I may remark here that this dreadful malady is creating great havoc in Lamu and all the surrounding districts; in places there is not a house where there is not one dead, and at the little town of Siyu, on the Island of Patta, it is reported that no less than 1,400 people have died during the epidemic.

I arrived at Mpecatoni in four hours and a-half, and that afternoon was seized with fever. On the following morning at daylight, although weak and trembling, I was compelled to start for Kipini, where I arrived in seven hours, feeling comparatively well, having walked through the fever. On the march we met a party of Somalis who attempted to stop my porters, but upon seeing an armed party following they desisted. The distance between Mpecatoni and Kipini is from 20 to 25 miles.

That evening I succeeded in dispatching a messenger to Simba to tell him I had come to see him, and to ask for porters, as I could obtain none, every one being afraid to go to Witu.

Kipini is a small village on the northern side of the mouth of the River Ozy. It is stockaded to protect it from the Watoro, but the defences are in wretched order. The River Ozy at its mouth is about a mile wide, and very shallow at low water, a man being able to walk across. Outside there is a reef right across the entrance of the river, which in the south-west monsoon forms a very bad bar. They say there is a passage in the reef through which small dhows pass in the north-east monsoon, but I could not distinguish it by the eye, even when the sea was comparatively calm.

Contemporary Lamu-Kipini-Witu

The plantations round Kipini seemed to be cultivated with more care and better result than those nearer Lamu; this I attribute to the freedom from molestation by the Watoro, it being obviously to the advantage of those people to keep on good terms with the inhabitants of their only port, Kipini. In the centre of every field is a high platform, upon which stands a slave with a pile of stones at his feet and a sling in his hand, the missiles from which must do much more harm to the grain than the birds the man is there to frighten away.

On the 15th August I visited a large ruined town about a mile and a-half to the northwards of Kipini. It must once have been a place of considerable importance, well built of stone, and covering a large area. It is said it was deserted sixty years ago in consequence of repeated attacks from the Galla tribes, who then inhabited the immediate neighbourhood, but I should think the more probable reason was the sudden silting up of the good harbour upon whose shores it was built: what, not so long ago, was a deep and well-protected haven, is now, at low water, an extensive dry sand-bank.

In this ruined town is the interesting tomb of Fumo Liongo, a great Swahili hero and poet, of whom there are most romantic stories extant, and whose exploits are still sung in his own verses, the language of which is written and recited in the ancient classical Swahili tongue, nowadays understood by very few people, if any. There is a story told of Fumo Liongo, something similar to the legend of Achilles and his heel. Fumo Liongo, from his wonderful escapes in battle, was also said to be invulnerable but in one place, and that was his navel. He was supposed to be invulnerable there also, unless stabbed by a blood relation with a copper needle. Some conspirators prevailed upon Fumo Liongo’s son, Sali, to try the experiment, promising him the Chieftainship as his reward if successful. Sali thereupon stabbed his father whilst asleep, but he was immediately himself killed by the conspirators for his cruelty. Fumo Liongo’s grave is still visited by pilgrims.

On the afternoon of Friday, 16th August, a party of twenty-nine men arrived from Witu in answer to my letter to Simbha, viz., twenty porters and nine armed men. These people amused themselves in the evening dancing and singing. Their war dances were very savage, but their singing was most melodious and pleasing, and the time they kept wonderfully correct, the whole performance being entirely different from anything I have seen amongst the neighbouring people, and far superior.

Somali War Dance

I left Kipini at daylight on 17th August for Witu, and passed through a more or less open country, with numerous valleys of fresh water, some of which become dry in the dry season and some do not. On the march we disturbed a large lion right in our path; the spoor of these animals was to be seen everywhere. Witu has been visited once or twice by white men, but not for several years. The soil around is rich and productive, and underneath at various depths is ancient coral rock. Witu lies in low ground, and adjacent to the town is a large valley of very salt water, which curiously enough is full of fresh water fish and none other. I should imagine that all the country in the immediate vicinity of Witu was very unhealthy.

The town itself is in the centre of the densest bush I have seen, about three or four miles round; so dense and so impervious is it, that it gives you the impression of having been artificially planted for defence, and I consider there is little doubt but what it has been so planted. It is strongly stockaded with trunks of trees, but the bush has grown over all the stockade so as to quite conceal it, except at the gates, which are very massive, and can only open wide enough for one man to pass at a time. These gates are always kept strongly secured. When I arrived at 11 a.m. I still found them shut, and it took over a quarter-of-an-hour to remove the obstructions. On entering the town I walked at once to Simba’s stone house, and found him ready at the door to receive me, splendidly dressed; with him were his two sons, Fum Bakari and Mku, and his brother-in-law, a light-coloured Swahili or Arab, called Monyi-bi-Abdallah. After a few minutes’ conversation I withdrew to the house prepared for me. At 2·35 p.m. I returned to Simba, and, reading from notes of the object of my visit, had a long interview. I told him –

1. That I was an officer sent to Lamu and its neighbouring districts by Her majesty the Queen of England to protect British subjects and to encourage trade, with the hopes that the stimulation of the legitimate trade would in time, by making the people more wealthy, tend to check petty wars and disturbances and to encourage agriculture.

2. That I had come to Witu, in obedience to orders, to ask him, in the name of Her Majesty the Queen, to protect British subjects, traders, and travellers, and to help them in their legitimate enterprise by his power and influence.

3. If at any time he had cause for complaint against any British subjects, I asked him to send them or their names to me at Lamu, but not to take the law into his own hands, or to allow his people to do so either.

4. On the other hand, I asked him, if British subjects were injured by his people, that he would see them righted.

5. I asked him not to permit British subjects, in aby way, direct or indirect, to embark in the Slave Trade, and begged that he would inform me of any such attempt.

6. I spoke about trade generally, specifying different articles, and recommended peace and agriculture as the greatest sources of wealth.

Simba promised to attend to all I had asked him, and also remarked he wished me to beg you (Sir John Kirk) to tell the Sultan of Zanzibar that he (Simba) was an old man now, and wished to live and die at peace with all men; and he asked me to do if he could guarantee that his people should commit no further enormities or depredations; this he said he would do.

I then withdrew.

Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar

From what passed at this interview I was inclined to think that Simba was sincere in his desire for peace and quiet; but from events which subsequently occurred I imagine he is more or less playing a double game. The common gossip is that Simba is sincere for peace, but that it is his son, Fum Bakari, who is the firebrand. I am inclined to think that, although undoubtedly Fum Bakari is a great rascal, he is more or less made a scapegoat to conceal his father’s and Monyi-bin-Abdallah’s designs.

That evening after dark Simba’s brother-in-law and chief adviser, Monyi-bin-Abdallah, called on me, and asked for a private interview, which I granted.

To my amazement he commenced what he had to say by threatening me.

The burthen of his communications were words or innuendos to this effect:-

1. That I had written four months previously to propose a visit to Simba, and had not come until now; consequently I had insulted Simba, and my conduct merited punishment.

2. That the English had assisted His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar in taking prisoner some Chief or other at a place called Makelli, through whom until then Simba had been in the habit of obtaining his guns and ammunition, and now that I was in their power retaliation upon me was perfectly just; but, however, there was a loophole by which I might escape, if I myself would consent to run guns and powder for them from Lamu, but if I declined the consequences might be unpleasant. In reply, I expressed with some warmth my indignation at my non-arrival in Witu before now being made a grievance. As for the Chief at Makelli, I declared I had never even heard of the man, and did not know what he alluded; and in reply to his suggestion, that I should run guns, I point-blank refused to do anything of the kind. At that moment happily we were interrupted, and Monyi-bin-Abdallah flew out of my hut in a passion. The man’s manner towards me was so threatening, sinister, and ferocious, that I could not but feel uneasy at my helpless position, in a town full of savages so securely walled that a cat could not escape from it; and I plainly saw from the drift of his remarks that the rumour is not unfounded, that Simba is about to join Mbaruk (the rebel Chief against the Sultan residing near Mombasa), and that the idea had suggested itself to Simba to make a prisoner of me to play me off against any attacks made upon them by His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar.

I may remark here that Simba can bring about 3,000 men into the field, but not all armed with guns. That night and the following day I had a rather serious return of fever, and in my stifling mud-room, with no ventilation or light, and swarming with rats and every description of vermin that feeds on man, my sufferings were considerable. On the morning of Sunday, the 18th August, I was visited by Monyi-bin-Abdallah, and I positively declining to renew the conversation of the previous evening, he suddenly informed me I could have porters to leave Witu when I chose, so I at once settled to leave on the following morning at daylight.

Sir John Kirk

At 4 p.m. I went to take leave of Simba, whose manner was cold, and I then received his permission for a Hindi trader to settle in Witu. Simba also informed me he should send for my interpreter in the evening to make a communication. My interpreter accordingly went after dark, and Simba then repeated to him, without the threats, all that Monyi-bin-Abdallah had said to me the previous night.

Simba also told my interpreter to ask me, in the event of my still refusing to smuggle guns for him, to beg you (Sir John Kirk) to undertake the business. I have not the least doubt that Simba had ordered Monyi-bin-Abdallah to try and frighten me into compliance, but that failing, for some reason or other he determined to let the matter drop, and appeared in a hurry to get rid of me.

I may remark here that punishment from His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar sooner or later, seems to be very generally anticipated at Witu, and I consider it would be wise not to dissapoint them, but to destroy the whole colony as soon as possible, and capture their leaders, or, with their rapidly increasing strength, they may very possibly attack him somewhere. Anyhow, if unmolested much longer, the Watoro will succeed in completing the ruin and destruction of this fine country.

Slaves are numerous at Witu, Simba alone possessing 600. The plantations are extensive and fruitful, the soil being very productive; a peculiarly large species of coconut is grown in them, of a superior kind to any I have seen in Zanzibar, Lamu or elsewhere. In addition to Witu there are six principal villages in the vicinity under Simba, the inhabitants of which call themselves “Watoro Witu,” namely, Hassad, Mohonde, Mawasi, Chaoja, Gowgowi, and Mominfoi,; the inhabitants of these seven villages together number nearly 5,000 souls. A little to the northward are several more villages, whose inhabitants call themselves “Wakengi.” The most important of these are Balana, Katana, Balo, and Mtangamakondo. These Wakengi are partially independent of Simba, but he commands them in most things, and only the other day put some of their Headmen in prison for disobeying his orders.

I left Witu on the morning of the 20th before daylight, and arrived at Kipini in five hours.

On the 21st August, after endless trouble in obtaining porters, I started my return journey to Lamu, arriving at Kolumbi on the 22nd. Having loaded my boat I dropped down the creek in the evening, intending to anchor somewhere near its entrance, but a fine breeze springing up I pushed straight on through the night to Lamu, arriving there safely without incident.

I have, &c.

(Signed) John G. Haggard.

Source: Haggard to Kirk, 25th August 1884, FO 403/93, TNA

A year after the great African explorer Dr David Livingstone’s death in 1873, his friend Horace Waller published an edited version of his diaries. In his introduction to ‘The Last Journals of David Livingstone, in Central Africa, from 1865 to his Death’ Mr Waller remarks ‘Whilst in the Manyema country he ran out of note-books, ink, and pencils, and had to resort to shift which at first made it a very debateable point whether the most diligent attempt at deciphering would succeed after all.’

Unprocessed and Illegible Livingstone 1871 Field Diary

In fact Mr Waller and his team transcribed only a third of his field diary written on the 24th November 1869 edition of The Standard newspaper. Dr Livingstone had at this time resorted to using ink made from pigment derived from the seeds of a local plant. Legibility was further reduced by the newspaper print over which Dr Livingstone had written at a 90-degree angle.

It was not until 2011 that this ‘very debatable point’ would be resolved when a team comprised of among others Dr Keith Knox, Dr Adrian Wisnicki and Mr Michael Toth using spectral analysis was able to both suppress the newsprint and enhance the diary text, making the 1871 Field Diary legible for the first time in 140 years.

Processed and Legible Livingstone 1871 Field Diary

The importance of the transcribed document is enhanced by the fact that it contains Dr Livingstone’s original diary entries made during the infamous Nyangwe Massacre of 15th July 1871. The slaughter of an estimated 4-500 local villagers by Arab slave traders exacerbated Britain’s anti slave-trade policy in East Africa and would have contributed to the Sir Bartle Frere Mission to Zanzibar of 1872, whereby Britain signed a new Anti-Slavery Treaty with the Sultan Barghash. Accounts of the atrocities was passed to Henry Morton Stanley during his meeting with Dr Livingstone in Ujiji, but the original Field Diary which was received together with the explorer’s other documents in 1873 was illegible upon arrival.

Presenting the team’s findings at Birkbeck 5th November 2011 Dr Wisnicki held that the newly transcribed diary renders Dr Livingstone as ‘more complex and not so uni-dimensional as portrayed in posthumous edited diaries.’ The diary suggests that witnessing the massacre horrified Dr Livingstone and that he afforded great importance in recording the atrocities for a global audience. Although he normally made daily entries, he changed to hourly reporting during this time. The spectral imaging also reveals that he changed from using the plant pigment to his remaining supply of more permanent iron gall ink.

Dr Adrian Wisnicki Presenting the Spectral Analysis Team’s Findings at Birkbeck 5th November 2011

The team have published the diary together with the edited versions to enable scholars to easily compare the texts. The differences between them held Dr Wisnicki to be ‘astounding and almost completely different.’ The results of the spectral imaging of Dr Livingstone’s 1871 Field Diary and other details about the project can be accessed by any interested party from this link: http://livingstone.library.ucla.edu/1871diary/

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/11/16/deciphering-livingstone’s-1871-field-diary/#more-1424 

 

Source: http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/

During the first few years of the 20th century, British authorities were speculating into the feasibility of establishing a Jewish settlement on the Gwas Ngishu plateau in the British East Africa Protectorate. In this regard the Commissioner of British East Africa, the multi-linguist Sir Charles Eliot, produced a memorandum contemplating the potential consequences of establishing, what would have been, an Israel in modern day Kenya and Uganda.

Gwas Ngishu Plateau, FO 2/785, TNA

In his report dated 4th November 1903 Sir Eliot makes what may be construed as a rather interesting remark seen with modern eyes.  He states that “It is not likely that non-Jews will much frequent the Jewish settlement, but their rights should be carefully reserved. When circumstances permit the persecuted to become persecutors, they are apt to find the change very enjoyable, and it would not be convenient for Christians if they were compelled to observe the Jewish Sabbath.”

The proposed settlement scheme known as the ‘British Uganda Programme’ was turned down by the World Zionist Organisation in 1905.

Eliot to Lansdowne, 4th November 1893, FO 2/785, TNA

Situated at the confluence of four tectonic plates, the islands of Japan is subject to a high level of seismic activity. Large scale earthquakes has historically occurred in fifty-year cycles with the most recent Tōhoku earthquake of 11th March 2011 also being the largest on record, measuring a magnitude of 9 Mw. Until the unfolding of the last few days devastating events, the most deadly earthquake since 1960 took place 20 kilometres outside Kobe 17th January 1995. Measuring 6.8 Mw it took 6,434 lives  and caused an estimated $102.5 billion worth of material damages, 2.5% of Japan’s contemporary GDP.  Although not being of a relatively large magnitude, its proximity to a urban area magnified its destructive potential.

Japanese Earthquake Magnitudes vs GDP/Capita Development Y-o-Y (%) 1960-2011

A rough comparison of Japanese GDP/Capita development and historical seismic activity reveals the predictably negative effect earthquakes have on the Japanese economy. With the 2011 tremor being on an unprecedented magnitude of 9 Mw, causing a devastating tsunami which laid North-East Japan’s coastline destroyed, killing upwards of 10,000 people and included damage to several nuclear reactors which again is likely to cause severe environmental damage. As such the 2011 earthquake will also be unprecedented in human, ecological and material cost.

Current preliminary estimates range to upwards of $200 billion, however quantifying such massive disasters is a virtually impossible task. It is however clear that Japan needs the global community’s help, humanitarian and economic in order to see it through this terrible ordeal. In lies not in the proud and mild mannered Japanese nature to accept assistance, but then one must insist for it is in the best interest of us all to overcome this apocalyptic vision as soon as possible.

The first months of 2011 has seen the fall of two autocratic regimes and the imminent toppling of a third. It is a period which will be on the receiving end of scrutiny by  historians speculating in the causes of what is unfolding before our contemporary eyes in generations to come. In order to provide an explanation of why these changes have taken place today one must look to the economic, political, social, demographic and technological factors that has aligned to form a ‘perfect storm’ igniting popular risings.

Hosni Mubarak Facing the Tunisian Domino-Effect (Latuff, 2011)

It is easy to oversee the fact that the financial crisis of 2007 that primarily hit the developed economies also affected the economies of the third world. In the case of Northern Africa, their large tourism industries were affected, causing an economic rippling effect that increased unemployment rates and lowered standards of living among the socio-economic strata that constituted the largest demographic element of these societies. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the recession also served to weaken the regimes’ state apparati, reducing their retaliatory capabilities. Another demographic factor would be the large proportion of youths and young adults, especially of those in an age bracket susceptible to politicisation and without dependent families. Their opportunity cost in terms of the risks associated with political activism is lower than of those in older age strata. The principal technological factor was the widespread use of social media enabling both a rapid dissemination of information and a demonstration effect; making manifestations of political discontent more visible. Lastly there was the domino-effect, once one regime could be toppled by popular risings it was clear to others residing in similar societies that their actions could be copied with predictable success. The extent to which this ‘Arab Spring’ will herald the beginning of a more democratic Arab World is yet to be seen, but it is already certain to have left a mark on history.

There is often a causal relationship between a country’s demographic composition and its relative economic performance. Ceteris paribus, the greater proportion of working age individuals in a population, the greater capacity a country has for production of goods and services relative to their commitments in terms of schooling, pensions, healthcare &c to the non-working generations. These factors would be most pronounced within states having a strong institutional framework and also often above a certain economic threshold.

Belonging to a large generational cohort as opposed to a small one brings many economic and political advantages. As a modern welfare state is structured around an ‘inter-generational social-contract’ whereby the working age population provides for the younger and older generations, a linear population development pattern is optimal. However human history has rarely afforded such stability, a fairly recent example disrupting social stability is WW2 resulting inter alia in a post-war ‘baby boom’.

Demographic Composition vs GDP per Capita Growth Norway 1845-2010

Whilst undoubtedly bringing much joy to their parents, the large cohorts born after the war put a substantial economic strain upon the contemporary older and smaller generations financing their (largely in the Western World) substantially free education. Upon reaching working age the so-called baby boomers, through sheer weight of numbers, caused arguably a socio-cultural revolution but also an unprecedented level of economic growth. Combined with the entry of women into the workplace and the smaller generations preceding and succeeding them, they also enjoyed relatively low taxation levels as their short-term social financial commitments were accordingly lower. Adding to this was the economic benefit of steadily rising property prices due in large part to this demographic anomaly.

In failing to produce a correspondingly substantial succeeding generation, the baby boomers, whilst enriching themselves when being in the working age stratum, simultaneously sowed the seeds for a potentially impoverished existence as old-age pensioners. This is due to the structure of national pension schemes which are based on a pay-as-you-go principle, as there will be substantially fewer tax payers to finance social commitments in terms of pensions and healthcare over the coming decades.

Historical and Projected Demographic Composition vs Historical GDP per Capita Growth (Norway, 1845-2060)

The political and economic problems affiliated with this marked rise in pensioners is currently at its very beginning in most Western states, with retirement rates set to increase markedly from 2011 onwards. Luckily for the baby boomers they still constitute such a substantial cohort that they retain the political power to effectuate the political reforms needed to maintain their wealth levels, this will however be reduced in tandem with increased death rates over the next 10 to 15 year period. The ways to mitigate the effects of this demographic transition is increased immigration, increased taxation increased fertility rates and increasing the standard retirement age, the latter two being the only sustainable solutions for the long-run. Increased life-expectancy and technological innovation increasing work efficiency are positive factors in this regard, however the Western welfare states will still face the greatest challenges to their continued existence since their inception.

Sources:

GDP Data: Angus Maddison, University of Groningen http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm

Historical Population Data: Statistics Norway http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/Default_FR.asp?PXSid=0&nvl=true&PLanguage=0&tilside=selecttable/MenuSelS.asp&SubjectCode=02

Projected Population Development: Statistics Norway, Medium Scenario http://www.ssb.no/folkfram_en/

 

African Trade Beads Mid-19th Century

A favourite currency among European and African alike during the 19th century was glass beads. Inexpensive and portable for the European explorer or trader and having a high intrinsic value for the natives, it was used extensively for the exchange of goods and services. It would prove invaluable for those engaged in long-distance expeditions as explorers often remained completely dependent upon the foodstuffs provided by the local inhabitants. Although employing porters often numbering in the hundreds to carry the equipment and supplies required for treks lasting months or even years, it goes without saying that it would be impossible to bring an adequate amount of food along from the very start. Potential carrying capacity would also be reduced on behalf of the biological peculiarities of Central Africa with the Tsetse fly barring the use of beasts of burden, making human porterage the only viable option. Another popular bartering tool was brass wire, this however posed a greater logistical challenge due to its bulky nature.

Source: TNA, FO 84/2097

With the opening of the African interior during the Scramble, demand for hard currency in the form of beads increased and Italian suppliers such as ‘Ceresa-Millin’ eagerly offered their services. Being shrewd businessmen they advertised their services much the same way as being done today, sending marketing material directly to potential customers. Identified as one such client was the Africa department in the Foreign Office, where ‘Ceresa-Millin’ offered ‘Glass Beads for the African Trade’ in ‘every kind, size & colour’.

Source: The National Archives at Kew, FO 84/2097

Report on the Mombasa Victoria Lake Railway Survey

Chapter VIII – Slave Trade in Connection to the Projected Railway

by Captain J.W. Pringle R.E.

12th May 1893

A caravan of Swahili porters and Arab masters marches up country to trade for ivory. This is their ostensible purpose, but they always combine a certain amount of slave trading with this more legitimate object. The caravan fixes upon some spot as its head-quarters, makes a strong stockaded camp, and then smaller parties of men are sent out in various directions to trade for ivory. The head-quarter camp awaits the return of these parties and purchases food for the return journey, or employs the time in hunting elephant. Here and there a few slaves, chiefly women and children, are bought by the various parties, and children are also kidnapped. On the return of these parties to their head-quarters, the caravan moves on, and the same procedure is followed. When the stock of trades goods is exhausted, the return journey to the coast is commenced. So long as the caravan marches through unfrequented country, no attempt at concealment is made; but through districts where detection of their slaves is possible, the following system is adopted. The caravan splits into two parties; one with the bulk of the ivory and Swahili porters marches by the usual roads openly, and pays recognised customs dues at the Company’s posts.

A Slave in Zanzibar

They account for the diminution in their numbers by epidemics of small-pox, by the recurrence of famine or war, and will related most circumstantially how such and such men were cut up in the Suk or Nandi country. Meanwhile the other portion of the caravan, the remunerative portion, marches by unfrequented roads to the coast, making detours wherever the proximity of a caravan with a European leader necessitates such a move. On arrival at the coast, the same system of deceit is carried out; one portion of the caravan marching into Mombasa with the bulk of the ivory, and the same story of their losses. The second portion further subdivides into smaller parties which march to various Arab shambas. The ivory and slaves they get rid of piecemeal as opportunity offers, the former being sold to Indian traders, the latter to Arabs or Swahilis. The slaves are employed in the shambas by their masters, who thus obtain cheap labour. The women generally become wives or concubines of their owners, and their children growing up consider themselves Swahilis. So far as is known these women and child slaves are treated well, as there is no reason for the employment of cruelty. This is a sketch of the programme as related by gentlemen of experience in the Company’s service, such as Messrs. Jackson and James Martin

East African Slave Routes, 19th Century

The number of slaves and slave caravans is variously estimated, some saying that the practice is very prevalent, others that it is not so. One of the oldest officials of the Imperial British East Africa Company has given it as his opinion that this form of slave trade is increasing, and shows no sign of diminution. So far, however, I think we are justified in assuming that no Swahili ivory caravan returns to the coast without some slaves. Several well known Arabs on the coast are reported to send an annual caravan more for slaves than for ivory.

The railway survey parties were joined by runaway Usoge slaves at Nzoi, and by Chaga (Kilimanjaro) and Masai boys at Machako’s, and by Wawavi women at Tsavo. All of these had deserted from Arab caravans who avoided the survey parties. In Sotik large parties of armed natives collected in commanding positions near villages on the approach of our caravan, and in reply to a question regarding their intentions, would say: “We are here to prevent your men from kidnapping our young men and women.” This would point to the general custom of Swahilis in the country, as European caravans but rarely travel by this road.

Caravans from the German sphere of influence starting from Pangani, Duseri, and other places are known to travel into the British sphere and take down slaves with them, the facilities for slave trading being undoubtedly greater by these routes than by the Company’s trade route. Unless such slaves are actually caught in the slave sticks which are now rarely employed, it is exceedingly difficult to prove anything. The women are said to be wives of some member of the caravan, and all are warned not to say anything to the “Mzungu” (European), who will do unheard of things. The slaves, mostly women and children, often carry light loads for their masters; but their value is not as carriers.

Freeing a Slave from his Shackle on HMS 'Sphinx' off the East Coast of Africa 1907

The slaves once purchased by Swahilis or Arabs, are as a rule well treated. Their lives are valuable, each represents so much in the way of trades goods paid down, and so much additional money value at the coast. Children that have been kidnapped have also a marketable value, and, so long as they do not attempt to run away, are also fairly well treated. But it must not be supposed that this form of slave trading is free from horror. Apart from the discomforts and hardships incidental to the long weary march, there is the fact that, through a foodless or waterless tract of country, it is the slaves who suffer the greatest privation, and not their masters. Again these slaves that are purchased though not separated or torn away from their homes and relatives by the Swahilis, have previously undergone that fate at the hands of their former masters.

An Arab Slave Merchant

They are, in fact, generally captives of war. They represent part of the spoil of a successful intertribal campaign. For some cause or other, generally with a view to obtaining cattle, sheep and goats, one tribe attacks a weaker neighbour, sets fire to the villages, carries away their flocks, spears the men, and carries off so many of the women and children as fail to make good their escape. The women may become the wives of their captors, in any case are employed as domestic slaves; but on the arrival of a Swahili caravan they will be sold for iron, or brass wire, or some article of barter. In fact so cheap are these slaves in certain districts, that west of Mt. Elgon women prisoners of war are sold for two large coloured beads apiece.

There are other cases where, on account of famine from failure of crops, or from loss of cattle by disease, natives have been known to sell their offspring for food, or for the wherewithal to buy food. The Masai were doing this in 1892, round Lake Naivasha, under pressure of the cattle disease. Sometimes children voluntarily run away from their homes and join a caravan for the sake of obtaining food, and subsequently are sold by the Arabs into slavery. Other tribes, such as the Wasoga, even without the excuse of famine, sell their relations.

Still, as a general rule, it may be accepted that the bulk of slaves purchased are captives of war.

Source:

Report on the Mombasa Victoria Lake Railway Survey, 12th May 1893 by Captain J.W. Pringle R.E., Chapter VIII – The Slave Trade in Connection to the Projected Railway (National Archives Reference: FO 83/1240)

An old soldier neglected by an ungenerous country. (The Morning Leader, October 1892)

Captain Lyons McLeod, F.R.G.S., 1860

English governments have a rather unpleasant reputation for neglecting the humbler heroes of the nation; and another instance of the kind which goes to support the public impression has been brought before the notice of The Morning Leader. The story of Capt. Lyons McLeod, R.N., is a sad one. At 67 he finds himself penniless, prospectless, and broken in health, although he has served his country by many brave deeds.

HM Brig ‘Arab’ in hot pursuit of a Slaver in 1856

In November, 1841, he entered the British Navy, and while a midshipman on board the Illustrious, he volunteered for service on the West Coast of Africa in the suppression of the slave trade. There he saw some very stirring movements, and one of his own achievements was heroic. While in command of the Albert’s boats on detached service he captured three slavers in one week on the Rio Pongas. The last of the three was the Venus, which was lying securely hidden in a creek with her hull out of sight, and branches of trees lashed to her masts, so that she seemed part of the forest. The young middy had only three white and two black men in his boat, and the Venus had a crew of 26; but when, by signs known only to sailors, they discovered her position the lad and his followers made such a gallant fight that they captured the ship, warped her out of the creek under a heavy fire and got her away to sea. The approach of a vessel with what appeared to be growing trees for masts caused no little sensation at Sierra Leone, and the midshipman and his crew were all promoted. McLeod became a lieutenant at the expiration of his sea time. He again volunteered for service on the African West Coast, and spent some time in doing good work on the Penelope and the Centaur. In 1853 he laid before Sir Roderick Murchison and the Royal Geographical Society a plan for opening the Niger to commerce, by ascending th river on the rising of the waters. He was confident that he knew the cause of the failure of the Niger Expedition of 1841-2, and placed faith in the native story that the bursting and overflowing of the lagoons along the banks at the end of the rainy season raised the level of the river sometimes as much as 60ft. in 24 hours. The delta was then submerged, there was no malaria, and the river was healthy. His theories were justified by the result. His plan was adopted, and an expedition commanded by Dr. Backie ascended the river, and returned with the loss of a man. The Niger was thus opened through McLeod’s agency to civilisation and commerce.

The Niger River Delta

A death blow was struck at the slave traffic, and England secured a great trade in palm oil and other commodities. Peiterman and other German geographers have spoken of the services of “McLeod of the Niger,” as they call him; but otherwise he complains that he has had no recognition. In 1856 he became Consul of Mozambique, and by vigorous action he stopped what was virtually the slave trade under the denomination of a “French Free Labor Emigration.” His dispatches convinced a committee, presided over by Prince Napoleon, that the slave trade was very thinly disguised by this name, and the Emperor of the French paid an indemnity of 15 million francs to secure its cessation. Thereafter, however, McLeod’s Consulate was abolished, and he not only received no compensation, but was considerably out of pocket by his residence there. After being disappointed in the hope of official promotion, he was created Consul of the Niger, and spent several years in that very troubled territory. He took part in many stirring events.

Bishop Samuel Crowther

He saved a warship which grounded on the river; he fought fierce battles with the pirates; he rescued Samuel Crowther, the black bishop, only lately dead, from the clutches of pirates; he suppressed many centres of the slave trade, and opened many avenues of trade. His most momentous experience was nothing less than a war with a fierce and powerful native chief who attacked the Consulate, and, failing to take it, invested it for nine months. In the end the chief was beaten, his force dispersed, and a great obstacle in the way of civilisation removed. The privations Capt. McLeod suffered during this trying time brought on acute dysentery, and he was invalided. He got no further than Madeira on his way home, and lay there six months in a state of prostration.

American Sailors Fighting Pirates, Early 19th Century

When at last he arrived in London he found that his Consulate was to be abolished, and the only compensation he got for the loss of a salary of £700 a year was a pension of £50. Since then the man who opened the Niger has held no appointment, and misfortune has followed him fast. Continued illness and necessity, and the long and fatal illness of his only son, made demands far beyond the power of a pension of £50 to meet; and he was in his extremity obliged to commute it. From that time he has been without satisfactory resources. He has written several books. His “Eastern Africa,” published in 1860, has been placed in the Royal Library at Windsor by command of the Queen. He also published in 1865 a history of Madagascar and its people, which was recognised by the native authorities as a work of great value.

Sir Robert Fowler

Besides these works he has published others of considerable worth, and he is the inventor of some useful appliances. This is the story of the old man, now partly blind and suffering internal maladies brought on by privations in Africa. He is absolutely without means – literally penniless – and he appeals to the Government for a grant from the Civil or some other fund which will keep him in his old age out of helpless dependence and poverty. He submitted a petition for such aid in 1885; it was supported by the then Lord Mayor, Sir Robert Fowler, Sir William McArthur, the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, and many others, but it produced no effect. The poor old man is still bright and cheerful, in spite of all these trials, and he laughed like a boy as he fought his battles o’er again with a representative of The Morning Leader. He is very modestly averse to notoriety, and he asks no charity. All he asks is a slight recognition of his undoubted and undeniable services to civilisation and humanity. Perhaps a generous public opinion will now give his petition the greater weight of its support.

 

Source:

The Morning Leader, article published October 1892, as an attachment to a letter from the  Salvation Army to the Foreign Office, FO 84/2263

Deutsch-Südwestafrika

Foreign Office

Translation.

Berlin.

May 31, 1892.

Sir,

With reference to your note of the 21st instant relative to the employment of Camels in the S.W. African Protectorate, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that last year 10 Camels were imported from Teneriffe into the Protectorate and have been used with satisfactory results by the protective force serving there ( Schutz truppe ) for transport purposes during their marches and latterly for carrying the post between Walfischbay and Windhonk.

Deutsch-Südwestafrika, Kamelreiterpatrouille 1906

The animals stand the climate and food very well, they are remarkable for their powers of endurance, for the small amount of food and water which they require and for the hardness of their hoof.

As regards this last point, the Commander of the Protective Force, Captain von François, during a four months journey through Namaqualand, part of which was over very stony ground, observed that the camels hoofs remained sound whereas those of the horses and train-oxen were worn away.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity

etc.

( sd. ) Marschall.

His Excellency

Sir Edward Malet GG.C.B.

etc.             etc.             etc.

Sources:

Letter from Marschall to Malet, 31st May 1892, FO 84/2254

Translated Letter from Marschall to Malet, 31st May 1892, FO 84/2254

The perils of relying upon debt to balance one’s books has been clearly demonstrated by the current financial crisis engulfing the Western economies. A particularly striking example is Greece, where revelations of gross misconduct on behalf of the state has transpired; a prolonged period of government debt-financed overspending leading to it’s rather unenviable current position as Europe’s financial pariah.

Merkel & Papandreou Photo: Herbert Knosowski/AP

Thankfully for the Greeks and the European Union’s single currency, Germany agreed to bail the aforementioned country out by providing €22.4 billion to the international rescue package. However this is neither the first time the Hellenes are in a financial Hades nor indebted to the Germans.

‘Regretfully we are bankrupt’

An ambitious modernisation programme financed through excessive government borrowing coupled with a fall in the price of the country’s principal cash-crop; currant*, led the prime minister Trikoupis to declare his country bankrupt in 1893. Trikoupis’ modernisation programme included heavy infrastructure investments, but it failed to restructure the Greek economy. The nominal debt burden of 630 million francs, with principal and interest repayments absorbing half the 1893 national budget could not be sustained.

Trikoupis 1893

The low interest rates that came as a result of the 1873-1895  Long Depression would make cheap capital too lucrative to resist for a prime minister with grand designs for Greece’s economic future. Unfortunately it also reduced international demand for Greek exports, a contraction which rampant international protectionism did nothing to ease. The following debt spiral sees its parallel today but hopefully for the Greeks the Germans won’t insist on yesteryear’s method of incentivising’ repayments.

Bleeding a Stone

Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador to the Imperial Court in Berlin was a Sir Edward B. Malet, a Foreign Office mandarin since the tender age of seventeen he would retire later that year after 41 years of Crown service. In a private letter to Lord Salisbury dated 27th July 1895, who would just win his third premiership that summer, and after a conversation with the French ambassador, Sir Edward made a remark that is distinctly interesting with regard to today’s Greek situation.

Sir Edward B. Malet

“In a moment of expansion he told me that the German Govt had begged him to induce his Govt to join with that of Germany in a Naval demonstration against Greece to force her to come to terms about the debt. The French Govt however stood firm in refusing to go in for such a policy, saying that it was no use to try to bleed a stone.”

Hopefully for the Greeks there will be no Teutonic demand for a ‘Naval demonstration’ off the port of Pireaus in order to induce them to meet their financial commitments. The French displaying remarkable restraint and realism in approaching the problem of Greek default, perhaps on behalf of their own frequent experiences with ill-minded creditors. In both instances of Greek financial trouble there was social unrest and political upheaval, but where Trikoupis failed in reaching a compromise with the capital owners, losing the 1895 election and dying a year later, Papandreou has managed to secure a bailout and has not been forced to declare to the Greek parliament like his predecessor in 1893: “Regretfully we are bankrupt.”

*Interestingly the price of currant had reached such levels three years prior to the bankruptcy that there had been calls in the House of Commons for a reduction of the duties levied on the grape, as reported in The Times 9th May 1890:

Henry Du Pré Labouchère

“Mr Labouchere scouted the idea that the consumer in England would gain anything by the reduction of the duty on currants. If the duty had been taken off raisins then there would have been a reduction to the consumer, owing to the competition from various countries; but currants came from Greece alone. Currants came from Greece and could not be produced by any other country in the world, because if the currant vines were transplanted to other places they produced large grapes with stones in them. The Greek people, therefore, having a monopoly of the production of the article, and being a very intelligent commercial race (laughter), would raise the price of currants to an amount corresponding to the duty remitted.”

Sources:

Private Letter from Sir Edward B. Malet to Lord Salisbury, Berlin 27th July 1895, FO 343/13

The Times, Friday, 9th May, 1890; pg. 6; Issue 33007; col B House Of Commons. Thursday, 5th May.

The Bankruptcy of Greece in 1893

Germany Tries to Save the Euro – All by Itself.

2010 estimate is based on the year's first 178 days with the recorded 314 casualties.

June 2010 is based on the first 27 days of that month, with the 2010 annual data based on the year's first 178 days with the recorded 314 casualties.

Afghanistan 'Fighting Season' last from June to September/October, with a slight respite in July.

An earlier article speculating in the causes for the intra-annual casualty trend: http://thecivilisingmission.com/2010/04/05/fighting-season-in-afghanistan/

Source: icasualties.org

...

“War is an act of violence that has no limit.”[1]

The Conquest of Constantine 1837 by Horace Vernet

Upon Algerian independence in 1962, France and its former colony could look back at an armed conflict that had lasted for eight years, cost the lives of close to half a million people and radically transformed the French Republic itself. When Algerian demands for civil rights and greater autonomy fell on death ears, the resultant actions taken by militant Algerians would trigger disproportionate French reprisals and a spiral of escalating violence would be set in motion. The taboo that still surrounds the topic in modern France bears witness of the tragedy that was the Algerian war in terms of both scope but also the intensity of violent methods employed as both sides would resort to and systematise the most unspeakable acts of violence. Following the classical doctrine of guerrilla warfare, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) employed terror as a weapon, aimed at provoking violent reprisals from the French regime. The reprisals would lead to a spiral of violence, recruiting soldiers to the guerrilla movement, whilst disrupting society and force public opinion against the incumbent political administration. The polarisation and mobilisation of a society in which the metropolitan imperial power was in an overwhelming minority would ultimately lead to defeat, as public opinion in the metropole’s democratic system would not tolerate the coercive methods used to maintain sovereignty.

To seek the causes for the violent nature of the decolonisation one must see the transition in terms of the events and circumstances preceeding it, the particularities of Algerian society, culture and geography, the French metropolitan regime and policies, the FLN’s ideological agenda and the doctrines of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency.

L’Algérie Française

We did not bring to Africa our liberal institutions; instead we dispossessed it of the only ones which resembled them.”[2]

Containing some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth, Algeria is situated northeast on the African continent, covering the lion’s share of the Maghreb, second only to the Sudan in size. With most of the population inhabiting the arable and hilly areas along the coast, the interior is sparsely populated with rugged terrain, alternating between desert and mountains. It is here the native Berbers would seek refuge from the various conquerors that through the course of history settled along the Mediterranean. The three most influential of these conquering peoples in relation to Algeria’s modern society were the Arabs, the Ottomans and the French. With the Arab invasions came Islam and the associated Arabic language and culture, the Ottoman Turks was the first power that would establish Algeria as a distinct political entity in the Maghreb, whilst the French would extend the frontiers to penetrate deep into the Saharan desert[3].

Realising a plan initially devised by Napoleon, Bourbon France launched an assault on the Regency of Algiers in 1830, rapidly capturing the city and exiling the Ottoman Dey. France would however be met with considerable resistance another seventeen years, most notably from the emir of Mascara Abd al-Qadir, using the terrain and highly mobile troops to attack the French in a guerrilla fashion[4]. In a premonition of what would follow over one hundred years later, the emir’s resistance strategy and tactics would in substantial ways be mirrored by the FLN, both in terms of using neighbouring states as sanctuaries, emphasising mobility, engaging the enemy on their own terms and the use of the terrain to their own advantage. In the same manner and initially on the receiving end, French strategy would evolve to meet the challenge put forth by the emir, under the leadership of Marshal Bugeaud. Combining a surge of troops, mobile “flying-columns”, punishment raids, a brutal scorched earth tactic, a network of army posts and direct political administration of villages to quell the resistance[5].

Marshal Bugeaud

Over the 1840s France would subsidise immigration of European settlers leading “eventually to the formation of a sharply divided caste society[6], the Second French Republic ultimately declaring Algeria to be an integral part of its land in 1848. The initial forty-year period of French rule, Algeria was primarily administered by the military, with local governance in the hands of Marshal Bugeaud’s Bureaux Arabes[7]. With a growing European population, referred to as the pied noir, demands for political reform was met by the metropolitan authorities in the 1870s, the reforms enacted would largely be in place until Algerian independence. This included the formation of three départements in Algiers, Oran and Constantine. These were the regions that had seen the most pronounced European immigration, and the settlers would be afforded similar rights and political representation as those of mainland France. Above the departmental prefects was the governor-general, traditionally never a pied noir, which in turn would report to the French Ministry of the Interior. The councils advising the governor-general was both dominated by Europeans, with partially elected members and the remaining appointed from the cadre of officers and prefects. The minority Algerian delegates underwent careful screening before being appointed[8].  Outside the three départements direct military rule prevailed, whilst the lowest level of civil administration was either the communes de plein exercice or the communes mixte[9] depending upon the ratio of pied noir to Muslims. Irrespective of Muslim proportion the pied noir held sway over every important political position, reserving three fifths of the municipal council seats for Europeans. The communes mixte resembled most the European model of ‘empire on the cheap’ and would as such also be the source of most Algerian dismay over the course of the 20th century. Consisting of an appointed pied noir administrator, ruling with the help of local caïds[10], the ratio of administrators to natives could reach 1:60,000[11].

Muslim Algerians, regarded as subjects, would have the opportunity to gain French citizenship, but as this would entail renouncing sharia law it remained a theoretical option for the vast majority[12].  The natives would thus be subjected to open discrimination by the colonial state, in terms of political rights and in the access to education and other state provided services.

Triple Exécution a Sétif by Fortune-Louis Meaulle

Prima facie evidence of this discrimination was the series of exceptive laws enacted in the 1870s outside of French common law and applicable only to Muslim Algerians, the code de l’indigénat. The laws, surviving in essence until the Second World War, provided the regime with the right to punish those within its jurisdiction for thirty-three infractions. These included defaming the French Republic, speaking disrespectfully to an official, travelling without a permit or failing to report a birth[13]. As the code de l’indigénat primarily dealt with minor infringements another court system was set up in 1902 to deliver swift justice in more serious cases, the tribunaux répressifs[14].

In tandem with the special judicial treatment, the Muslim Algerians were also subjected to fiscal inequality in the form of a continuation of the Ottoman taxation regime, the impôts arabes, in addition to an introduction of a range of French taxes. Some of these were taxes on land, on livestock, infrastructure maintenance, in addition to an obligation to supply labour, corvée, for the state[15].

Whilst the greatest fault line of French Algeria was drawn between the European pied noir and the Muslim indigènes, another distinct divide existed between the ordinary settler, referred to as the petit blancs and the oligarchic elite, the grands colons. Most ordinary pied noir were working or lower middle-class of mixed European descent, whilst the grands colons were gradually to come into possession of Algeria’s best farmland and largest companies. Of the 984,031 pied noir resident in Algeria by 1954[16] only one fifth were of French origin, the remaining eighty percent were of Spanish, Italian, Maltese or other European descent[17].  These socio-economic aspects of the pied noir population served to heighten their perception of being in direct competition with and threatened by the Algerian natives. Equally, as some were fifth generation colon and perhaps without substantial French ancestry, the pied noir would naturally regard Algeria to be their place of origin and retain a strong affinity to the land.

The asymmetric legal, political and economic status in favour of the pied noir in the mid 20th century was thus apparent. With the circa one million Europeans owning, in a principally agricultural economy, more than 2.7 million hectares of the best cultivable land, controlling all political institutions and using the law as an instrument to reinforce this status quo. French policy had resulted in a marked deterioration of the Algerian economy, with particularly dire consequences for the native peoples, driving them from their farmland through expropriations and agricultural consolidation strategies, leading to urbanisation. External factors such as several poor harvests, the great depression and the Spanish flu would add to and exacerbate the economic consequences of poor governance.

Aside from the political, legal and fiscal-economic discrimination, the native population would also be confronted with little French understanding of the centrality that religion played in their society. With French authorities taking control of all principal religious establishments such as the three madrasas exclusively licensing clerics, in addition to eroding the financial positions of the religious institutions[18].

The 8.5 million Algerians[19] were substantially marginalised despite being in a clear majority in their own land; this laid the foundation for the counter-colonial ideology that would find fertile ground among the population.

Reform proposals from the Algerian elite seeking to alter this privileged pied noir position vis-á-vis the indigenous population was vehemently opposed by settler parliamentary representatives in mainland France. The survival of an apartheid-like system was seen as crucial for the Europeans to continue maintaining an income per capita that was on average seven times higher than that of the indigenous population[20]. The centenary celebrations of the French conquest in 1930 marked a watershed in the political awakening of Algeria’s Muslims. Large public demonstrations took place all over the country, with all social classes joining in.  With the ascension of Léon Blum to French Premiership in 1936 a reform bill, after consulting with former governor-general Maurice Violette, was suggested.

Léon Blum

The Blum-Violette bill would extend French citizenship to an approximate 20,000 members of the Algerian native elite, without prejudice to their personal status as Muslims[21]. Although seemingly not radical, the bill defined Algerians, among a range of other qualifying prerequisites, which held certain academic degrees as eligible for citizenship. This could have a substantial impact over time as educational opportunities spread.  However, the proposed reform bill would never be passed due to a combination of pied noir lobbying and French concern against the weakening of its strategic position in Algeria during a growing military threat from Nazi Germany. The failure of the bill only served to alienate the moderate Algerian political establishment, now turning instead to the radical nationalist movements seeking Algerian autonomy such as Messali Hadj’s Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA)[22]. The moderate integrationist Ferhat Abbas became disillusioned and would later establish Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien in 1946, for then to join the FLN in 1955.

At this point French policy had moulded the social reality in Algeria to fulfil nearly all prerequisites for a militant movement to launch a successful insurgency against the incumbent regime. However, practical capability in the form of military training was still lacking among Algerian youth, but this would soon change with the advent of the Second World War.

The Logic of Terror

“Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.”[23] Revolutionary wars are by nature political and generally fought as insurgencies; Galula (1964)[24] has identified four key prerequisites for it to be successful: an ideological cause that is widespread among the population; administrative weakness within the incumbent regime; a not-too-hostile geographic environment; and outside support in the middle and later stages.

David Galula

It is inherently an asymmetric type of warfare, whereby the insurgent possesses the strategic initiative, he can choose when to strike and thus under the most favourable circumstances. There is a substantial power difference between the insurgent and counterinsurgent, this is most pronounced in tangible assets such as military weapons and personnel. The successful insurgent on the other hand will possess the most intangible assets in the form of ideological power and he can use the population to become invisible to the counterinsurgent. The regime also possesses a great liability; it must uphold order throughout the country. Creating disorder is the insurgent’s tactical objective; it disrupts the economy and undermines the counterinsurgent. “Moreover, disorder – the normal state of nature – is cheap to create and very costly to prevent.”[25] Following this logic the insurgent should adopt a strategy that involves employing terror as a weapon. The grenades thrown into cafés or the massacre of civilians in a brutal, ritualistic fashion are means to this end. It not only ties up enemy military assets for defensive purposes, it incites fear and polarises the civilian population, eliminating the moderate interlocutors available to strike a compromise.

H34 and French Légionnaires from the 2e REI

As a catalyst to the war that would be unleashed nine years later, the massacre at the town of Sétif on the 8th May 1945 took the lives of 103 Europeans, some of which in a severely brutal fashion. The French retaliation was however disproportionate with estimates of 6,000 Muslims dead from an indiscriminate bombing campaign[26]. The reprisals served to polarise Algerian society, politicising the native veterans returning from the European theatres of war. It also meant a crackdown on all organised Algerian nationalist activities and a false feeling of security for the pied noir. The settler political leadership would however squander the opportunity for reaching out to Algerian moderates and with French defeat in Indochina, the immediate precursor to the FLN would plan the initial strike of the Algerian War[27].  Taking inspiration from this loss of baraka[28] by the French army, the group called the neuf historiques identified their objective clearly as the independence of Algeria and would use the necessary force in terms of violence to achieve this. Guerrilla warfare’s primary intangible asset is ideological power, Mao Tse-tung described a political cause succinctly, as: ”an unsolved contradiction.”[29] In Algeria’s case this would mean the discrimination the native Algerian population had been subjected to for over a century. The FLN precursor also identified other prerequisites that would make their armed struggle likely to achieve success; the administrative weakness of the French, spread out over a vast territory; and possible support from Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.

The Philippeville Massacre

For the incumbent pied noir regime, their role as counterinsurgent would begin with the All Saint’s Day 1954 bombings. Although the Philippeville massacre of 1955 would prove a turning point, as the FLN moved into urban areas and employed the most brutal methods of terror in killing pied noir civilians. The following disproportionate French action of killing between 1,273 to 12,000 Algerians in response would seriously escalate the war, mobilise the Algerian population and preclude any peace negotiations[30].

Central to revolutionary warfare is control over the population; as such both belligerents would target civilians. When the French offered poor Muslim Algerians land in exchange for resettlement, the FLN would assassinate any civilian accepting the offer[31]. The French military would also institute a severely repressive regime against the population as the war escalated in the form of torturing any detained Muslim Algerian for potential information regarding the FLN. Torture became routine interrogation practice when De Gaulle in 1958 installed hard-line generals Jacques Massu and Raol Salan, who wanted a decisive French victory regardless of cost[32]. A concrete example of this took place at the end of the war on the 17th October 1961, when two hundred Algerian detainees were tortured, killed and dumped into the Seine on orders by the Parisian Police Prefect[33].

Concluding Remarks

To answer the question as to why the decolonisation of Algeria became so violent, one must seek to answer the question relating to why the Algerians would support the idea of waging an insurgency against the French regime. The discriminatory nature of the présence française, covering all aspects of the Muslim Algerians’ lives affords a substantial rational for supporting a counter-colonial ideology. Most of Algerians efforts of non-violent agitation within the system were frustrated, De Gaulle’s extension of an offer to award unconditionally all Algerians French citizenship in 1958 was too little too late. A key to the problem was the political influence the pied noir politicians and lobby held in metropolitan France. As has been the case in most settler colonies, the settlers themselves have often vested interests in perpetuating a system of inequality and will strongly resist reform. Should the metropole heed to these demands, one might see short term benefits for the minority settler community, but in the longer term one might expect violent uprisings from the stratum that are discriminated against. Once the insurgency was kindled, the French would play into the hands of the guerrilla strategy of responding with the most draconian measures against the general populace. This brutality would partly stem from the pied noir own insecurity and to remain in their adopted homeland, partly the belief that Muslims only respected firm action, and the unwanted realisation that post-war France was in the twilight of empire.


[1] Clausewitz principle cited in Marnia Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008) p. 89.

[2] A Jardin, Alexis de Tocqueville, Écrits et discours politiques, (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) p. 207.

[3] John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992) p.1.

[4] Ian F. W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerilla Warfare, (Oxford: ABC CLIO, 1999) p.1.

[5] Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerilla Warfare, p.6.

[6] John Ruedy, Islamism and Secularism in North Africa, (London: MacMillan, 1994) p. 6.

[7] Alastair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006) p. 32.

[8] Alf Andrew Heggøy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, (London: Indiana University Press, 1972) p. 6.

[9] Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 33.

[10] Ruedy, Modern Algeria, p.94.

[11] Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 33.

[12] Ibid., p. 36.

[13] Ruedy, Modern Algeria, p.89.

[14] Ibid., p.90.

[15] Ibid., p.90.

[16] Ibid., p.69.

[17] Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 51.

[18] Ruedy, Modern Algeria, p.100.

[19] 1954 estimate, cited in: Ruedy, Modern Algeria, p.69.

[20] Ibid., p.114.

[21] Heggøy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, p. 19.

[22] Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 41.

[23] David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964) p.3.

[24] Ibid., p.42.

[25] Ibid., p.11. At most, the FLN budget was $30-$40 million a year, less than the French spent in 14 days.

[26] Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 27.

[27] Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire, p. 4.

[28] Grace that is accorded from on high.

[29] Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p.21.

[30] Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 120.

[31] Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p.79.

[32]Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire, p. 4.

[33] Ibid., p. 5.

Recommended Reading:

A Savage War of Peace, Horne, A. (2006)

The sharp division between developed and developing countries is often described as the “North-South Divide.” The term was coined during the cold war as a way to geographically categorise countries on the basis of their socio-economic development level. With the rise of the Asian Tigers, Newly Industrialising Economies and not to mention Middle Eastern oil wealth, many has deemed the term passé. With the supposedly many examples of rich countries residing in low latitudes I thought it would be interesting to analyse the data statistically and to demonstrate the phenomenon graphically.

GDP per Capita vs Latitude

The chart clearly demonstrates the economic division between societies predominantly around the equator (0 degrees latitude) and the societies to the north and south. Using the term North-South Divide is clearly not passé, although one should be aware of the exceptions that proves the rule.

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